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A. DAN TARLOCK*

The Future of Prior Appropriation in
the New West
We water guys never confront the hard issues.... We find a
temporaryfix and hope we're retired before we have an answerfor
it. Then if our kids are attorneys, they can make a living sorting it
out.'
Basic twentieth century New Mexico water law was built on two
bedrock principles, beneficial use and prior appropriation.... State
Engineer Steve Reynolds believed in thefirst principleand disliked
the second so much 'that he disregarded it....Priority of
appropriationstruck Reynolds as a silly way of apportioningshort
supplies in New Mexico.!
I. INTRODUCTION: THE OLD VERSUS THE NEW WEST
A. The Old West and Prior Appropriation
It is a truism to say that water has always been central to the
development of the West from the earliest recorded Indian settlements to
the present. The persistent fear that there will not be adequate, reliable
supplies to support existing and future demand distinguishes the West
from other regions of the country. Historically, institutions that control
access to water have played a central role in the politics and culture of the
West. Prior appropriation has been the primary institution for the
development and use of western water, but it is an institution under stress.
Thus, it is legitimate to ask, what is the future of prior appropriation? I
believe that the more appropriate question, however, is, how will the
doctrine continue to evolve?
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University. Research for this essay was funded by a grant from the Chicago-Kent Law School's
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Mexico, December 6,2001. 1 would like to thank the efficient Institute staff for making my trip
to Santa Fe so pleasant and Professor Em Hall for organizing the lecture and for his many
insightful editorial suggestions. The late Al Utton was a water and international law scholar
of uncommon breadth and humanity, and I am privileged to play a small part in perpetuating
his legacy. All errors of fact and judgment, of course, remain mine.
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The distinguishing feature of prior appropriation is its continual
evolution in response to a changing West. Because prior appropriation is
grounded in both abstract principles of justice and hard experience, it has
constantly had to adapt to changed conditions. The doctrine is
conventionally traced to the gold mining camps of California and Colorado
and the early Colorado irrigation settlements? It originally functioned as
a simple, judicially enforced, system to divide small streams for a region
sustained by mining, livestock grazing, and eventually irrigation. It did so
by creating private rights in a historic public resource, running water,4 and
by imposing minimal sharing rules through the beneficial use doctrine,
providing at least the illusion of a clear allocation rule in times of shortage?
Prior appropriation's basic principles, priority and beneficial use,
have remained constant, but the doctrine's function and application began
to change as the region grew. By the early twentieth century, prior
appropriation had evolved into an administrative system to allocate
unused waters on entire stream systems, to protect the rights of third
parties potentially injured by new appropriations or transfers, and to assert
a public interest in how increasingly scarce waters were allocated.' Prior
appropriation was so entrenched in the West by the end of the nineteenth
century that it allowed western states to limit the federal government's role
for most of the twentieth century to that of a water provider to state water
right holders at subsidized rates.!
The evolution from a simple set of judicially created rules to a
statutory permit system reflected the transition of the West from a livestock
grazing, mining, and dry farming economy to an increasingly large-scale
irrigation society with urban oases supported by aqueducts and multipurpose dams providing carry-over storage and hydroelectric power. Prior
appropriation, especially as it was incorporated into the law of equitable
apportionment, permitted the storage of water in progressively larger
carry-over storage reservoirs and thus allowed the western states to buffer
(armor, actually) themselves against both chronic aridity and the cycles of
rain and drought that plague other parts of the region. The state's interest
in water allocation increased as the West grew, but the legal impact of this
evolution was muted during most of the twentieth century. If one were to
simply read the cases, prior appropriation's progress would merely be
from an underdeveloped to a mature body of law as reflected in the great
early twentieth century Kinney and Wiel treatises.8 But, the focus on the
formal law ignores the significant changes in its function.
. One of the ironic features of prior appropriation is that in each era
the doctrine has led to developments that ultimately undermined it. The
first engine of fundamental change was the Reclamation Era, which lasted
roughly from the 1890s to the mid-1970s. Initially, the goal of federal policy
was to settle the West with irrigated family farms. To this end, support for
irrigated agriculture became a national priority. The Reclamation Program
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constructed dams to provide wide margins of safety for recurring periods
of drought and highly variable rainfall patterns and thus permitted farmers
to extend the irrigation season. The drafters of the Reclamation Act initially
assumed that federal support would be limited to the necessary loans to
construct project facilities that would be managed for and by the benefit of
farmers with minimal federal involvement. Massive federal subsidies were
necessary, however, to sustain the program. Large multiple-purpose carryover facilities were constructed in all western states to firm up western
water rights. 10
These carry-over storage facilities substantially reduced but did not
eliminate the risks of shortages, but, more importantly, the switch from a
direct diversion to a storage water allocation system has had a profound
impact on the doctrine of prior appropriation." The carry-over storage
reservoirs, which backstop water rights, not the law, are the main reason
that water rights are relatively firm regardless of the water year. Dams
made it increasingly unnecessary to enforce water rights in the rigorous
manner that the doctrine suggests and helped produce the culture of nonenforcement of the beneficial use doctrine.12 The threat of priority
enforcement decreased substantially. Water rights became more of a
general water entitlement to use water rather than the right to a specific
quantity used in a non-wasteful manner as specified by the formal
doctrine. As a result, prior appropriation became more and more of a
shadow doctrine. Increasingly, the federal government became the water
master on large rivers such as the Colorado, Missouri, and Columbia.13
Federal and state contracts often became the real allocation rules, and
because of this, water users were finding out their rights were often less
secure than previously assumed.14
B. The New West and Prior Appropriation
There is now a substantial gap between the formal and the actual
practice of prior appropriation. By the end of the twentieth century, the
doctrine had evolved from a simple allocation instrument into a mature
mixed administrative-property regime. At the same time, the West had
completed the transition from an eastern United States and European
colony to a powerful economic region fully integrated into the global
economy. This transition also roughly coincided with the environmental
movement, which focused attention on the ecological costs of a decade of
dams and diversions. The previously heretical, wasteful riparian idea that
some of a stream's flow should be left in place began to garner considerable
scientific and lay support. 5
Leaving water "in place" would have been incomprehensible to
almost all nineteenth-century westerners because it represented the waste
of a valuable resource, but students of Western water policy have identified
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aquatic ecosystem restoration as a key future challenge.16 There is a similar
widespread realization that the dams and diversions made possible by
prior appropriation are the cause of the degradation. 7 As the West has
changed from a raw commodity production colony to an urban region fully
integrated into the global economy, prior appropriation has been
increasingly criticized. The principal criticisms are that perpetual "use it or
lose it rights" lock too much water into marginal agriculture and generally
encourage inefficient off-stream consumptive uses to the detriment of
aquatic ecosystem values and the needs of growing urban areas. Critics
have either pronounced the doctrine dysfunctional or dead'8 or argued that
it should be replaced by non-perpetual permit systems that better value
consumptive and instream uses.
One of the reasons for the gap between form and practice is that
the state stewards of the doctrine have been slow to respond to a changing
West. The West is the most highly urbanized region of the country in
contrast to the mythical rural frontier. States have fallen behind the curve
in environmental protection and the inevitable economic rationalization of
irrigated agriculture. 1 The federal government has taken up some of the
slack. The federal interest in water allocation has progressed beyond the
protection of Indian reserved water rights and the misguided attempt to
enforce a 160-acre limitation, mandated by federal Reclamation Law and
including pollution abatement and the conservation of endangered species.
These programs give the federal government the power to assert regulatory
water rights. These rights arise because the duty to comply with federal
environmental mandates trumps the exercise of state water rightsY' The
assertion of new federal regulatory waters threatens to displace partially
the law of prior appropriation. Public and private stakeholders have
recently begun to cooperate to find ad hoc, "out of the box" solutions to
specific river basin problems" in order to avoid the draconian application
of the Endangered Species Act that finally occurred in the Klamath Basin
in the drought summer of 2001.'
The flow of water from rural to urban areas has further widened
the gap between the form and reality of prior appropriation. At its core,
prior appropriation is a law of irrigation rights, but irrigated agriculture's
future is one of stable or declining acreage. As growing urban areas and
environmental interests scrambled for new and temporary supplies, water
markets emerged as a major allocation force, using appropriative rights as
a measure of compensation. To the dismay of many irrigators, property
rights became a dual-edged sword. Irrigators venerated the security that
their water rights provided but were dismayed when another equally
entrenched characteristic of a property right, alienability, became the
instrument of change.'
Water markets are the logical consequence of the West's faith in the
benefits of unlimited growth. The combination of prior appropriation and
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federal and state water project construction allowed the once lightly
populated West to court successfully unlimited growth to induce
permanent and economically sustainable settlement in an inhospitable and
resources-constrained region.' The Reclamation Era, characterized by
large-scale water resources development projects in the name of regional
equity, has ended, but the population growth that it helped induce is
accelerating. With the exception of much of the Great Plains, which is now
reverting to frontier status, most of the fastest growing states and counties
are in the West.
The "new" West is economically and socially different from the
"old" West, and these differences have important implications for the
future direction of water policy. The old West, with the exception of the
Pacific Coast states, was an eastern and European colony that struggled to
sustain itself with a partially federally-subsidized economy based primarily
on raw commodity production: timber and minerals, irrigated agriculture
(and dry farming), and livestock. Growth had to be induced to settle what
remained a sparsely populated area except for the urban oases that
developed to support the economy.
The new West is characterized by a series of population centers
that now include Boise, Salt Lake City, Spokane, Denver, Colorado Springs,
Las Vegas, Sacramento, Eugene, El Paso, Dallas, Houston, Albuquerque,
Tucson, Phoenix, and Missoula. In the new West there is no need to induce
growth; it is happening.' The new West is growing for the very reasons
people were originally deterred from settlement of the region-its harsh
climate and rugged, often bleak, non-European landscape.
The new West's "commodities" have similarly changed to include
its climate, mountain and desert wilderness areas, scenery, free-flowing
rivers, and open space, combined with the public and private
transportation, educational, and medical infrastructure to support what
millions perceive as a high quality of life.' For my purpose, the most
important point about the new West is that it is relatively less dependent on
irrigated agriculture and raw commodity production generally. Irrigated
agriculture remains especially important in California, Idaho, Washington
State, and the western High Plains, but acreages are likely to stabilize or
decline throughout much of the West. '
The new West will inevitably produce changes in prior
appropriation, but the changes will be more subtle because they will be
more ones of practice than of form. Prior appropriation remains deeply
entrenched in the states and in the courts. In fact, as federal and state water
policy becomes increasingly decentralized and directionless, the strict
enforcement of water rights assumes an even greater importance. ' For
example, to the surprise of many, the California Supreme Court recently
actually applied the doctrine to a groundwater dispute with more vigor
than it had in decades. ' As many students of western water policy have
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observed, however, the doctrine's importance as a water allocation driver
has decreased in the past decades." Both the traditional state and federal
roles in water allocation have diminished as the Reclamation Era has come
to an end. Water politics are no longer the two-party federal-state
negotiation so ably practiced by the late Stephen Reynolds. 1 More and
more the states and federal government are likely to be one of a number of
stakeholders participating in ad hoc, basin-wide re-allocations.
The new West's rapid growth and transition to a post-modem
economy would be a sufficient stress for any nineteenth century institution,
but the hydrological foundations of the doctrine-variable climate and
severe but ultimately time-limited droughts-may be further undermined
by the uncertainties of the regional and watershed impacts of global climate
change. There is a growing scientific consensus that the earth's climate is
warming and that this warming can distort "normal water allocation"
patterns. The precise impacts on specific water resources are difficult to
predict because the climate change models suggest that the impacts of
climate change will vary greatly among the earth's regions. Any watershed
or river basin prediction must deal with high levels of hydrologic,
economic, and political uncertainty; however, the general risks that arid
areas face can be stated with some confidence. A recent IPCC assessment
concluded that "warmer temperatures will lead to a more vigorous
hydrologic cycle ....
" A 2001 report of the United States National Academy
of Sciences/National Research Council predicts that the most severe
impacts will be" drier than average conditions...."'
It is difficult to formulate a response because both the amount and
timing of rainfall may change but the geographic and temporal scale of the
change is uncertain. Some regions may experience decreased precipitation
and more extended droughts. Areas with present abundant supplies may
face new conflicts because of the combination of population pressure and
decreased annual runoff. Other regions will see increased precipitation and
more frequent and more severe floods. Increased precipitation is not
necessarily a blessing because it may not translate into more available
water supplies in all regions. In water-short areas with historically variable
rainfall patterns, increased precipitation may actually exacerbate efforts to
provide reliable water supplies. More precipitation may fall as winter rain
rather than snow, and thus the snowpacks may melt earlier as warmer
average temperatures mean that spring runoffs will come earlier and
evaporate faster. In addition, states and regions may have to adapt to
ecosystem changes and these must be factored into any adaptation
strategy. This will be difficult at the present time because the state of
climate change research does not permit managers to go from large-scale
models to specific watersheds and from watershed models to regional
predictions. Prior appropriation is a potential adaptation strategy because
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it is a risk allocation and reallocation system but the ability of the system
to respond to a radically altered climate has never been tested.
C. The Future of Prior Appropriation: Real or Shadow Doctrine
The net result of these stresses will be to solve water allocation
problems at a larger geographic scale, at either a basin or watershed level.
It will be necessary to deal simultaneously with both private and public
claims in ways other than through the simple determination and
enforcement of prior rights. The question naturally arises, is prior
appropriation well suited to the solution of large, multi-state holder
allocation disputes that will characterize the new West? The argument that
priorappropriation locks too much water into inefficient agricultural uses33
and does not make enough water available for growing cities and
ecosystem restoration is a powerful one, but, in the end, it does not
support the abolition or even substantial modification of the doctrine. The
beauty of prior appropriation is that it can function in both regulatory and
market environments and in conditions of stability as well as flux. There is
a powerful argument that the system has created such strong expectations
that its future evolution will be limited to the strict delineation and
enforcement of prior rights, be it state-created or federal substitutes;
however, I do not think that this scenario is sustainable in the long run.
In my opinion, the doctrine of prior appropriation will continue
to change because the underlying economic and social changes occurring
in the West are too powerful to lock it into place. Instead, the gap between
the form of the doctrine and the actual allocation of water will continue to
grow. During the Reclamation Era, federal subsidies and state law shielded
water users from the full force of the market. In the new West, at least for
the foreseeable future, markets and basin-specific institutions rather than
state and federal policy will be the major allocation drivers. Prior
appropriation will continue to function as the formal allocation rules for
water, but the carefully constructed scheme of preferences and allocation
rules will neither be an accurate reflection of actual allocation patterns nor
of many of the new entitlements.
In the future, prior appropriation will function primarily as (1)a
default rule to resolve small-scale conflicts, (2) a worst case enforcement
scenario in complex allocation negotiations to encourage parties to find
creative ways to avoid its actual application through cooperative
management regimes and other sharing arrangements that accommodate
a wide range of competing demands, and (3) a rule of compensation when
water is voluntarily transferred or to inform the constitutional analysis
when water is involuntarily reallocated.Most of these functions can be accommodated within the existing
doctrine, but some changes in the doctrine may be necessary to support the
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transition to the new West. Specifically, to support out of the box solutions,
more explicit risk elements must be incorporated into water rights. All
water rights are subject not only to the fixed risks of established rules such
as priority but also to additional risks created by new demands on the
system. In the future, the focus should be on the actual expectations that lie
behind a use, rather than the perpetual enforcement of the entitlement, so
that alternative ways of satisfying those expectations in ways that
accommodate new uses can be found. To support my thesis, I first examine
the reasons that I think that prior appropriation will endure in form and
then set forth my argument that the substance of prior appropriation will
be different from the original system.
II. THE ENDURING STRENGTHS OF PRIOR APPROPRIATION
As with the Eternal, if prior appropriation did not exist, the West
would have to invent something some thing close to it. Thus, many of the
past strengths of the doctrine will endure. Any water allocation regime
requires a set of reasonably predictable property rules. For this reason
alone, prior appropriation is likely to be part of the western landscape for
the foreseeable future. The doctrine's primary strengths are that it is the
law of water allocation in most of the West; the law is deeply imbedded in
history, at least the received history and culture of the West; it is somewhat
flexible; and the alternatives are not appealing. Thus, the prospect of
wholesale change is unlikely. The political costs of such change would be
very high and the potential benefits uncertain at best. Change will come by
plowing around the doctrine rather than plowing it under.
A. It Is the Law
Prior appropriation remains the primary water law of the western
states and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. There is no
strong, organized constituency advocating its replacement. Prior
appropriation sustains itself because it is both a law of rules and a law of
standards and it has a limited capacity to adapt to changed conditions.
Prior appropriation was initially developed as a fair and efficient risk
distribution scheme for a regime of many small-scale irrigators in arid and
semi-arid areas. The federal government was never able to develop a land
and water policy suited to the West, but the western states ultimately
developed a system to allocate the region's variable supplies to promote
investment in agriculture and urban development. As the late Frank J.
Trelease observed, "Itihe rule of priority does guarantee a firm supply for
all for whom the source is sufficient, and the senior irrigators can build a
stable agriculture unmatched in humid states."1
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Prior appropriation continues to allow courts to resolve relatively
simple disputes with minimum judicial discretion. The importance of rules,
as well as their cost, is illustrated by a recent case that limited the power of
the federal government to distribute the water of a Reclamation project out
of priority even though the Bureau of Reclamation had done so for a long
time. The court held that the Warren Act,' which allows the sale of surplus
water from Bureau of Reclamation reservoirs, precludes the Bureau of
Reclamation from making a pro rata or equal distribution between prior
right holders and Warren Act contractors different from that spelled out in
a Bureau-District contract.' The fact that users have previously consented
to the altered enforcement regime was found to be a basis for demanding
strict adherence to priority. In the court's opinion, a contrary result would
discourage short-term sharing agreements premised on the right to insist
on strict enforcement of priorities in the future.
B. It Is Somewhat Flexible
At the same time, prior appropriation can function as a flexible
doctrine that allows the creation of new rights and allows courts to temper
its harsh edges to facilitate new uses in situations where priority does not
work well. 9 The doctrine has endured in part because it is able to
accommodate new users and to adapt to the increasing scale of use. For
example, when hydroelectric power generation developed in the twentieth
century, the industry was able to use the water in the higher elevations
before it spilled into the agricultural valleys. Special rights for cities,4'
groundwater mining, and fish (instream flow rights),"1 which were not part
of the original irrigation economy, have been created.
The long-standing practice of not enforcing groundwater priorities
is a prime example of the doctrine's flexibility. Priority enforcement is often
not used when the economic costs would be unacceptably high.
Groundwater priorities are seldom enforced in groundwater basins
because strict enforcement would virtually preclude new wells and
severely limit agricultural development and present intractable
enforcement problems.'2 While the justice of this practice is questionable,
prior appropriation's greatest flexibility, water marketing, is less so.
Water rights, despite their usufructuary character, have always
been treated as transferable property rights. Transfers are not always easy
because of the original vision of the West as a land of small, irrigated farms.
Courts and administrative agencies sometimes impose costly restrictions
on water transfers.' The merits of water marketing, however, are now well
established throughout the West, even though they are not occurring at the
rate that economists and other enthusiasts would like." A major study of
water transfers in six states concludes that-with the exception of lawyer-
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dominated Colorado---the current transaction costs of water transfers are
not excessive.* The real barriers are political, not legalY
Flexibility can undermine security, but the paradox is resolved
when one recognizes that prior appropriation, backed by carry-over
storage, creates a sufficient illusion of security to stimulate investment. One
of the hidden virtues of prior appropriation is that priority exists more as
a threat than an actual enforcement practice.' Water rights exist within a
community of users who can tolerate equitable adjustments, and thus the
case for a narrow, fixed rule is less compelling than has traditionally been
assumed.4 9
Scattered empirical evidence confirms this assertion. Watermasters
who report to the Oregon Department of Water Resources regulated 265
streams in 1998 and reported 7,663 regulatory actions.' However, only six
violation notices were sent to users, eight formal enforcement orders were
issued, and no cases were referred to Salem for formal enforcement. The
Department offers two reasons for this low level of conflict. First, there is
a 98 percent voluntary compliance rate in the state that is achieved "not
without a substantial investment of time by field regulatory staff." Second,
"[wlatermasters spend a lot of time during regulation negotiating
voluntary reductions, rotations or compliance schedules with water users.
Often senior right holders volunteer to use less than their entitlement so
that junior users are not completely shut off.""1
Oregon's experiment illustrates that in most water use
communities, the costs of enforcing prior rights are often likely to be
unacceptably high, unfair, and disruptive of established uses-the very
goal that priority seeks to achieve.' This has long been the case in
California, which is famous for solving water allocation problems by
constructing a massive water infrastructure and allocating water by large
blocks, rather than by adjudicating and enforcing priorities. Even in
litigious Colorado, however, priorities have been "softened" by the creative
use of the beneficial use doctrine to allow new uses that increase the risk
of shortage for existing right holders. Colorado, in contrast to states such
as Texas' and Nevada,' does not determine whether unappropriated
water is available by simply examining paper records but allows new
appropriations on formally over-appropriated streams because the claimed
or paper entitlement may not represent the amount of water actually put
to beneficial use.'
C. Consider the Alternatives
Prior appropriation also flourishes by default because the
alternatives to priority are not appealing. There is, of course, little ethical
or empirical basis for a rule that subsequent in time is prior in right.? The
two principal alternatives are time-limited permit systems subject to public
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interest conditions' or the ad hoc judicial adjustment of existing water
rights to incorporate changed conditions, primarily instream flow
demands. Opponents of prior appropriation have long argued that more
flexible permit systems are necessary to balance public and private uses.
Many humid states have moved to a weak form of regulated riparianism
that overlays a permit system on the incoherent common law. To date,
these systems have not created a property rights system that comes close
to that created by prior appropriation and I do not think that the system
delivered sufficient, if any, compensating benefits. Nor is there a strong
case for a system that allows administrative, ad hoc, case-by-case equity or
efficiency modification of permits in times of shortage."
The limited experience with eastern permit systems, which allow
an administrator the discretion to displace existing permits or to refuse to
grant new ones, suggests that most states will follow a de facto priority
system.' The most plausible alternatives are rules of equal use or public
ownership and distribution. The first is perhaps the rule of riparian rights,
which has been rejected in both the far West and increasingly in the humid
east because any fairness benefits are outweighed by the extreme
uncertainty of the rule. As the late Jacob Beuscher demonstrated years
ago,6 ' a close study of riparian rights cases reveals that courts generally
find that the prior use is the reasonable use. The late Frank J.Trelease, long
time dean of western water lawyers, managed, over vigorous objection, to
make priority an element in the Restatement of Torts (Second) test of
reasonableness.' Section 850A of the Restatement of Torts (Second) makes
"the protection of existing values of water uses, land, investments and
enterprises" one of the nine relevant factors to consider in determining the
reasonableness of a use.
Ad hoc judicial intervention to reallocate water is not a satisfactory
alternative to prior appropriation. The most well known alternative to a
priority regime is use of the public trust doctrine to subordinate prior rights
to subsequent public uses. California has invoked the doctrine to reduce
vested rights when the exercise causes serious ecosystem damage.'
Hawai'i has used the doctrine to instruct the state water resources agency
to take its duty to protect instream flows more seriously when abandoned
water uses are reallocated."
The public trust doctrine reminds us that there has long been a
public interest component to state water allocation and that state duties
should extend beyond policing the distribution of private rights, but it
suffers from two limitations that preclude reliance on it as a viable
substitute for prior appropriation. First, the legitimacy of the trust remains
in doubt. This is largely a function of the debate over the source of the
doctrine and the failure of courts to articulate a coherent justification; 6 The
uncertainty over the source may explain why, outside of California and
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Hawai'i, states have refused to apply public trust principles to water
allocation.
Additionally, the doctrine is too open-ended, uncertain, and
potentially unfair to serve as an alternative basis for water allocation.
"Blockbuster" decisions such as NationalAudubon or In the Matter of Permit
Applications are useful to break political deadlocks and to jumpstart the
process of finding creative compromises,6' but resorting to public trust
litigation exposes a deficiency in the state's water allocation policy that will
ultimately have to be cured by a more comprehensive solution than a court
can impose.
III. WHY THERE IS LITTLE PRIORITY IN PRIOR APPROPRIATION
In this section, I examine one of the primary causes for prior
appropriation's diminishing role as the primary driver of western water
allocation. Classic prior appropriation has been gradually undermined by
water users, especially large ones, who have had to confront the
inefficiencies and inequities of the doctrine. I argue that the culture of nonenforcement is widely practiced, although less acknowledged for obvious
reasons, and contributes to two inter-related consequences that diminish
prior appropriation's historic allocation "primacy." First, the problems that
water users have encountered in trying to solve watershed or basin-wide
problems have led to more ad hoc solutions that modify prior
appropriation. Second, prior appropriation has been diminished by federal
laws that do not directly supplant the regime67 but impose additional
constraints on the exercise of state water rights.
A. Strict Enforcement May Be Unfair or Impracticable
Strict enforcement of priorities can be both inefficient and unfair.
The strict enforcement of priorities tends to lead to inefficient use practices
because the cushion of a senior right combined with the "use or lose it"
rules, abandonment and forfeiture, create powerful incentives to use the
maximum entitlement and to forego investments in water conservation
infrastructure. Larry MacDonnell's study of two adjacent irrigation districts
in the Yakima Valley of Washington State illustrates how inefficient it can
be to protect firmly senior water rights. One district, the Sunnyside
Division of the Yakima Project, has senior rights that go back to preReclamation Act diversions; these rights are primarily non-pro-ratable and
thus water is delivered according to pre-project priorities. The other, the
Roza Irrigation District, has a contract with the Bureau of Reclamation that
is pro-ratable among project beneficiaries. The Roza Division receives much
less water compared to the Sunnyside Division in dry years and "has
invested heavily in improvements in its water delivery and use systems in
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order to take best advantage of the water supply available to it."' Similar
situations exist throughout the West.6
Holders of instream flow appropriations may also find the rules of
prior appropriation apply only to them, a manifestly unfair result. In
Oregon, the Oregon Water Trust has been purchasing senior agricultural
water rights for instream flow maintenance and reports that they are
subject to much more rigorous change-of-use proceedings compared to
non-instream use transfers. The simple reason is opposition to instream
flow protection by the Oregon Farm Bureau and Cattleman's Association."
In short, there is full prior appropriation for fish, but not for irrigation. 1
Fish also may suffer from other alleged and unfair nonenforcement practices such as water spreading. In the Pacific Northwest,
there may be substantial deliveries of Reclamation Project water to nonproject beneficiaries to the detriment of endangered salmon. In 1994,
allegations of "water spreading," the delivery of water to ineligible or nonproject lands, surfaced and the Clinton Administration formed a task force
to eliminate the practice and recover past illegal benefits. In 1995, the Task
Force was terminated and the problem was turned back to the regions,
which is a prescription for inaction.' In the meantime, irrigators face
neither priority enforcement nor serious implementation of the beneficial
use principle.
The increasing inefficiency of strict priority enforcement of rights
is well illustrated by the evolution of general stream adjudications.
Beginning in the 1970s, many western states invested heavily in general
stream adjudications to confirm existing appropriative rights, to quantify
federal reserved Indian and non-Indian rights, and to improve the state's
water information base. No one knows how many millions of dollars have
been spent to accomplish these three objectives, but there is an emerging
consensus that general stream adjudications are not necessary to
accomplish any of these objectives. As John Thorson, the former Special
Master in the Arizona Gila River General Stream Adjudication and keen
student of the west-wide general adjudication experience, has observed,
"[m]any western adjudications have gradually slid into
obsolescence....Adjudications have not been able to stay ahead of the
West's problems.... [and] [wiater users and public officials gradually
realized they needed to work around the adjudications."73
B. Prior Appropriation Does Not Strictly Apply to Cities
Cities have long been able to modify the aspects of prior
appropriation that retard manifest destiny. They have been at the forefront
of perfecting strategies to buffer themselves in times of shortages and thus
minimize the possibility of priority enforcement. Urban centers were
initially able to live on the water not needed for irrigation, and when this
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was not enough, as was the case in the Owens Valley, ways were found to
move the water to areas of demand. Over time, cities obtained a superpreference based both on law and superior resources. The strict
enforcement of priorities is not likely to be applied against municipalities
when push comes to shove. Equity and efficiency aside, it is unlikely that
it will be politically acceptable to reduce substantially water deliveries to
large cities based on the strict enforcement of priorities. In addition, cities
have power and the financial capability and the legal authority to acquire
large reserves to buffer them. For example, municipal appropriations are
subject to lighter anti-speculative control compared to other
appropriations. The "progressive growth" doctrine allows a city to perfect
a water right based on its anticipated need for the water not in actual use.7 4
Cities also have a much greater capacity to adjust to short and
long-term droughts through temporary quasi-voluntary rationing and
demand management.75 Some cities are facing potential shortfalls, but
municipal capacity to sustain rapid population water growth is illustrated
by the growing number of western cities that have, of necessity, begun to
add water supply elements to their growth management plans. These
elements do not depart substantially from traditional manifest destiny
policies; they basically consist of growth accommodation rather than
growth limitation policies.76 For example, San Diego, California, faces the
double problem of limited natural surface and groundwater supplies and
a low priority Colorado River entitlement. The city has linked water supply
and growth as part of its ongoing growth management program and has
outlined a five-part strategy. In the future, San Diego will increasingly rely
on a combination of (1)more efficient use of existing supplies, (2) demand
management, (3) the reallocation of existing supplies through water
marketing, (4) more limited new storage and distribution facilities, and (5)
greater conjunctive ground and surface water use.7
The most extreme example of water planning and conservation as
a strategy for unlimited growth accommodation is Arizona's 100-year
assured water supply policy. This law builds off the traditional municipal
super-preference and puts all other water users on notice that water
markets will play an important role in meeting future urban demands.'
The state's Groundwater Management Ace9 imposes a duty on all new
developments, and thus on their municipal suppliers, to establish that there
will be "sufficient water which will be physically available to satisfy the
applicant's 100 year projected water demand."' The rules are structured
to eliminate reliance on continued groundwater mining to establish an
assured water supply. Initially, the rules set off a scramble to acquire
agricultural water rights in remote counties, but more recently municipal
suppliers have faced the inevitable and agreed to pay the high Central
Arizona Project rates for Arizona's underused Colorado River entitlement.
As Phoenix and Tucson have used more surface (CAP) water, municipal
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water use has started to decline in part because of a wetter than average
cycle, groundwater conservation, and increasing reliance on gray water for
turf irrigation. In 2001, California followed Arizona's example and enacted
legislation that requires that all new developments over 500 homes have a
"sufficient water supply" consistent with 20-year projections contained in
urban water-management plans.81 Other cities are slouching toward the
more radical step: marginal, rather than average, cost pricing to limit water
use. El Paso, Texas, estimates the recoverable groundwater in its share of
the Hueco Bolson, which it fought so hard to take from New Mexico,' will
be depleted by 2025, but the cities of El Paso and Ciudad Juirez will grow
to five million people. El Paso has implemented an aggressive conservation
strategy including a seasonable excess-use rate structure. This inverted rate
structure charges based on the customer's percentage use above their
average winter consumption.
C. The Larger the Allocation, the More Difficult It Is to Enforce
Priorities
Continued western municipal growth illustrates another reason for
the continued decline of the doctrine of appropriation. Prior appropriation
applies to large as well as small amounts of water, but the larger the block,
the less important priorities will be. There are many reasons for this
assertion. First, large blocks of water come from carry-over storage
reservoirs, and it takes a prolonged drought to produce shortages. Second,
larger block holders will have the political clout to resist enforcement.
Third, the larger the block, the easier it is for entitlement holders to absorb
proportionate cutbacks.
The low risk of priority enforcement among large block holders is
nicely illustrated by California's long success in diverting the Colorado
River in excess of its priority. In 1922, the seven Colorado River basin states
allocated the Colorado River between the two basins. Each basin was given
7.5 million acre-feet, and the lower basin states, Arizona, California, and
Nevada, were given an additional 1 million acre-feet. In 1928, Congress
passed the Boulder Canyon Project Act to authorize the construction of
Hoover Dam. The three lower basin states could not agree on an allocation
because California had already put over 5 million acre-feet to use. The Act
resolved the conflict by allocating 4.4 million acre-feet to California, 3
million to Arizona, and 300,000 to Nevada. Three years later, the major
California water users agreed to an internal priority schedule that applied
to the almost 5.4 million acre-feet of water the state was actually diverting.
To complicate matters, under the seven-party agreement, the four major
California irrigation districts adjacent to the River enjoy a superior priority
over the Metropolitan Water District, which serves much of urban Southern
California." Subsequently, Arizona v. California construed the Act as a
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congressional apportionment of the lower basin flow among the three basin
states and therefore confirmed the 1928 congressional apportionment,
which in effect subordinated California's customary use priority to
Arizona's equities.
The law and politics of the Colorado River have long been driven
primarily by the efforts of all the basin states, except California, to prevent
California's actual use from ripening into a permanent right." Arizona
technically succeeded in curtailing this use when the Supreme Court ruled
that the Boulder Canyon Project Act limited California to 4.4 million acrefeet and that the Secretary of the Interior had the power to apportion both
surpluses and shortages. California, however, has long been able to ignore
Arizona's entitlements for legal and hydrological reasons. First, Arizona
had to convince the federal government to authorize the Central Arizona
Project (CAP) to put her share of the River to use in the state's populous
interior. California was able to force Arizona to subordinate her CAP
priority to California's compact allocation as the price of congressional
authorization of the project. Second, the long delay in constructing the CAP
transformed it from an agricultural to an urban supply project and allowed
California to continue to use its 700,000 acre-feet of surplus water
throughout the entire twentieth century, even as central Arizona and Las
Vegas grew into major urban agglomerations. '
California's excess diversion is now ending. Exponential urban
growth in Arizona and Nevada, along with Indian entitlements and
compliance with the Endangered Species Act, raises the very real
possibility that California must now live with its 4.4 million acre-feet
allocation. The three lower basin states and the Department of the Interior
agreed to a curtailment plan that would never pass muster as a substance
abuse treatment program." There will be no cold turkey or paid
withdrawal for California. California will have at least 15 years to reduce
its diversions from 5.2 to 4.4 million acre-feet.
Many will read the success of the Department of the Interior and
the Basin states in forcing California to live within its Compact allocation
as the triumph of the strength of prior appropriation. A priority was
enforced. This is a legitimate reading, but it ignores the larger lessons. First,
enforcement was used as a threat to force a voluntary cutback on very
favorable terms to the "bad" actor. Second, California was able to agree to
live with its 4.4 million acre-feet allocation because the larger urban
suppliers will be able to use the irrigation districts along the Colorado as
a source of water supply through bribes and purchases.
In California, superior political clout allowed the state merely to
avoid priority enforcement for decades, but inter-regional power politics
can sometimes virtually eliminate priorities. The Missouri River is a case
in point. In 1944, Congress authorized the Pick-Sloan Plan," which turned
the Upper Missouri into a series of flood control reservoirs that primarily
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benefit the Lower Basin states. The grand compromise of Pick-Sloan was
that the Upper Basin states and Indian tribes would give up a great deal of
land for the mainstream reservoirs, which would provide immediate flood
control and navigation enhancement for the Lower Basin in return for
future irrigation projects. As the price for the dams, Senators O'Mahoney
and Millikan, of Wyoming, succeeded in enacting an amendment that gives
irrigation and other upstream consumptive uses priority over navigation,8'
but the Amendment is of no use to the Upper Basin states because the
irrigation component of the plan never materialized as originally
contemplated and is highly unlikely to do so in the future. The net result
is that the lower basin states have obtained a de facto priority for
navigation and flood control.
IV. CONCLUSION
The law of prior appropriation will increasingly evolve into a
shadow or framework allocation rule. This will not rob it of its core
function, the settlement of user disputes, but it will change its influence on
western water allocation. Courts will continue to perform their traditional
function of applying existing laws and settled precedent to concrete water
disputes, but the law will have an increasingly indirect rather than direct
impact as more water moves to urban and environmental users. Markets
and negotiated large-scale settlements rather than state and federal water
policy will become the primary force shaping the allocation of western
water. The law will continue to define the rights traded or adjusted
through a negotiated settlement but the formal doctrine will decline in its
importance.
Early in the last century, Samuel Wiel floated the idea that
unreasonable assertions of priority should not be recognized.8" The idea
proved too radical for courts to adopt in theory, but his suggestion reflects
a great deal of western practice. More importantly, Wiel's proposed reform
reflects the broader idea that the law of western water rights, in contrast to
land law, has always been a risk allocationscheme rather than a system of
relatively absolute property rights. The focus should be more on protecting
the actual expectations of water users" rather than on the formal
entitlements. Water right holders will reject this distinction because the
formal entitlement is the basis for a reasonable expectation. This argument
overlooks the fact that risk allocation has been submerged but not
eliminated from the doctrine. Carry-over storage successfully minimized
the risks inherent in prior appropriation and appropriative rights have
never been risk free; they have always contained a fixed risk allocation
scheme that prefers senior to junior water right holders in low water years.
The law presently assumes that short-term shortages represent the
maximum risk that right holders must assume, but the beneficial-use
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limitation in all water rights makes it clear that short-term shortages are not
confined to such shortfalls.
Three consequences follow from the explicit characterization of
appropriative water rights as risk allocation mechanisms. First, water users
must simultaneously plan for the reductions dictated by the strict
enforcement of priorities and for alternative reduction scenarios. In general,
priorities are likely to be enforced in the short but not the long run. A
serious shortage from a "natural" or "global climate change-induced"
drought will strain existing allocation schemes and induce different
adaptation patterns. Second, as the West tries to incorporate ecosystem
restoration into existing consumptive entitlements, new, often ad hoc risksharing schemes will emerge. These will not displace prior appropriation;
they will be overlain on existing entitlements, but these schemes have the
potential to alter existing entitlements, and they must be recognized as a
legitimate element in the evolution of western water law. They will be
generally imposed through consensus processes and thus have the
potential to fairly distribute the readjustment burdens, although the ongoing California Bay-Delta process illustrates how difficult these
adjustments will be." The third consequence is a revitalized beneficial use
doctrine. Reformers have "called" for the aggressive enforcement of the
beneficial use doctrine for decades,92 but, as commentators and studies
have pointed out, the call has been futile and the doctrine remains underutilized, under-enforced, and under-developed. As dormant as the doctrine
is, it reinforces the idea that appropriative water rights have always been
less firm and more subject to adjustment than their characterization of
absolute property rights assumes.
The new West will continue to experience rapid, unequally
distributed, population growth supported by the plumbing installed in the
last century. Some new infrastructure will be necessary to meet new
demands for water supply and flood control, but the primary task of state
governments will be to manage the existing infrastructure to make it more
productive, to manage the reallocation of existing supplies to new
demands, and to adapt to natural disasters exacerbated by global climate
change to the increased use of nonstructural alternatives. Prior
appropriation will continue to be part of the new West, but the carefully
constructed scheme of preferences and allocation rules will become less
and less an accurate reflection of either actual allocation patterns or of
many of the new and modified entitlements.
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